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Abstract. We consider multi-agent systems where agents actions and
beliefs are determined aleatorically, or “by the throw of dice”. This sys-
tem consists of possible worlds that assign distributions to independent
random variables, and agents who assign probabilities to these possible
worlds. We present a novel syntax and semantics for such system, and
show that they generalise Modal Logic. We also give a sound and com-
plete calculus for reasoning in the base semantics, and a sound calculus
for the full modal semantics, that we conjecture to be complete. Finally
we discuss some application to reasoning about game playing agents.
Keywords: probabilistic modal logic, proof theory, multi-agent systems
1 Introduction
This paper proposes a probabilistic generalisation of modal logic for reasoning
about probabilistic multi-agent systems. There has been substantial work in this
direction before [14,1,12]. However, here, rather than extending a propositional
modal logic with the capability to represent and reason about probabilities, we
revise all logical operators so that they are interpreted probabilistically. Thus we
differentiate between reasoning about probabilities and reasoning probabilistically.
interpreting probabilities as epistemic entities suggests a Bayesian approach [2],
where agents assess the likelihood of propositions based on a combination of
prior assumptions and observations.
We provide a lightweight logic, the aleatoric calculus, for reasoning about sys-
tems of independent random variables, and give an extension, the modal aleatoric
calculus for reasoning about multi-agent systems of random variables. We show
that this is a true generalisation of modal logic and provide some initial proof
theoretic results. The modal aleatoric calculus allows agents to express strate-
gies in games or theories of how other agents will act, and we present a basic
demonstration of this.
2 Related Work
There has been significant and long-standing interest in reasoning about prob-
ability and uncertainty, to apply the precision of logical deduction in uncertain
2and random environments. Hailperin’s probability logic [8] and Nilsson’s prob-
abilistic logic [17] seek to generalise propositional, so the semantics of true and
false are replaced by probability measures. These approaches in turn are gener-
alised in fuzzy logics [22] where real numbers are used to model degrees of truth
via T-norms. In [21] Williamson provide an inference system based on Bayesian
epistemology.
These approaches lose the simplicity of Boolean logics, as deductive systems
must deal with propositions that are not independent. This limits their practi-
cality as well defined semantics require the conditional probabilities of all atoms
to be known. However, these approaches have been successfully combined with
logic programming [11] and machine learning [3]. Feldman and Harel [7] and
Kozen [15] gave a probabilistic variation of propositional dynamic logic for rea-
soning about the correctness of programs with random variables. Importantly,
this work generalises a modal logic (PDL) as a many valued logic.
More general foundational work on reasoning probabilistically was done by de
Finetti [4] who established an epistemic notion of probability based on what an
agent would consider to be a rational wager (the Dutch book argument). In [16],
Milne incorporates these ideas into the logic of conditional events. Stalnaker [19]
has also considered conditional events and has presented conditional logic [20].
Here, conditional refers to the interpretation of one proposition being contingent
on another, although this is not quantified nor assigned a probability.
The other approach to reasoning about uncertainty is to extend traditional
Boolean and modal logics with operators for reasoning about probabilities.
Modal and epistemic logics have a long history for reasoning about uncertainty,
going back to Hintikka’s work on possible worlds [10]. More recent work on
dynamic epistemic logic [18,5] has looked at how agents incorporate new infor-
mation into thier belief structures. There are explicit probabilistic extensions
of these logics, that maintain the Boolean interpretation of formulae, but in-
clude probabilistic terms [6,9]. Probabilistic terms are converted into Boolean
terms through arithmetic comparisons. For example, “It is more likely to snow
than it is to rain” is a Boolean statement, whereas the likelihood of snow is a
probabilistic statement.
3 Syntax and Semantics
We take a many-valued approach here. Rather than presenting a logic that de-
scribes what is true about a probabilistic scenario, we present theModal Aleatoric
Calculus (MAC) for determining what is likely. The different is subtle: In prob-
abilistic dynamic epistemic logic [13] it is possible to express that the statement
“Alice thinks X has probability 0.5” is true; whereas the calculus here simply
has a term “Alice’s expectation of X” which may have a value that is greater
than 0.5. We present a syntax for constructing complex terms in this calculus,
and a semantics for assignment values to terms, given a particular interpretation
or model.
33.1 Syntax
The syntax is given for a set of random variables X , and a set of agents N . We
also include constants ⊤ and ⊥. The syntax of the dynamic aleatoric calculus,
MAC, is as follows:
α ::= x | ⊤ | ⊥ | (α?α :α) | (α |α)i
where x ∈ X is a variable and i ∈ N is a modality. We typically take an epistemic
perspective, so the modality corresponds to an agent’s beliefs. As usual, we let
v(α) refer to the set of variables that appear in α. We refer to ⊤ as always and
⊥ as never. The if-then-else operator (α?β : γ) is read if α then β else γ and
uses the ternary conditional syntax of programming languages such as C. The
conditional expectation operator (α |β)i is modality i’s expectation of α given β
(the conditional probability i assigns to α given β).
3.2 Semantics
The modal aleatoric calculus is interpreted over probability models similar to
the probability structures defined in [9], although they have random variables in
place of propositional assignments.
Definition 1. Given a set S, we use the notation PD(S) to notate the set of
probability distributions over S, where µ ∈ PD(S) implies: µ : S −→ [0, 1]; and
either Σs∈Sµ(s) = 1, or Σs∈Sµ(s) = 0. In the latter case, we say µ is the empty
distribution.
Definition 2. Given a set of variables X and a set of modalities N , a proba-
bility model is specified by the tuple P = (W,pi, f), where:
– W is a set of possible worlds.
– pi : N −→W −→ PD(W ) assigns for each world w ∈ W and each modality
i ∈ N , a probability distribution pii(w) over W . We will write pii(w, v) in
place of pi(i)(w)(v).
– f : W −→ X −→ [0, 1] is a probability assignment so for each world w, for
each variable x, fw(x) is the probability of x being true.
Given a model P we identify the corresponding tuple as (WP , piP , fP ). A pointed
probability model, Pw = (W,pi, f, w), specifies a world in the model as the point
of evaluation.
We note that we have not placed any restraints on the function pi. If pi were
to model agent belief we might expect all worlds in the probability distribution
pii(w) to share the same probability distribution of worlds. However, at this stage
we have chosen to focus on the unconstrained case.
Given a pointed model Pw, the semantic interpretation of a MAC formula
α is Pw(α) ∈ [0, 1] which is the expectation of the formula being supported
by a sampling of the model, where the sampling is done with respect to the
distributions specified by pi and f .
4Definition 3. The semantics of the modal aleatoric calculus take a pointed prob-
ability model, fw, and a proposition defined in MAC, α, and calculate the ex-
pectation of α holding at Pw. Given an agent i, a world w and a MAC formula
α, we define i’s expectation of α at w as
Eiw(α) =
∑
u∈W
pii(w, u) · Pu(α).
Then the semantics of MAC are as follows:
Pw(⊤) = 1 Pw(⊥) = 0 Pw(x) = fw(x)
Pw((α?β :γ)) = Pw(α) · Pw(β) + (1 − Pw(α)) · Pw(γ)
Pw((α |β)i) =
Ei
w
(α∧β)
Ei
w
(β) if E
i
w(β) > 0 and 1 otherwise
We say two formulae, α and β, a semantically equivalent (written α ∼= β) if for
all pointed probability models Pw we have Pw(α) = Pw(β).
The concept of sampling is intrinsic in the rational of these semantics. The
word aleatoric has its origins in the Latin for dice-player (aleator), and the
semantics are essentially aleatoric, in that they use dice (or sample probability
distributions) for everything. If we ask whether a variable is true at a world,
the variable is sampled according to the probability distribution at that world.
Likewise, to interpret a modality the corresponding distribution of worlds is
sampled, and the formula is evaluated at the selected world. However, we are not
interested in the result of any one single sampling activity, but in the expectation
derived from the sampling activity.
This gives us an interesting combination approaches for understanding prob-
ability. Aleatoric approaches appeal to frequentist interpretations of probability,
where likelihoods are fixed and assume arbitrarily large sample sizes. This con-
trasts the Bayesian approach where probability is intrinsically epistemic, where
we consider what likelihood an agent would assign to an event, given the evidence
they have observed. Our approach can be seen as an aleatoric implementation
of a Bayesian system. By this we mean that:
– Random variables are Aleatoric, always sampled from a fixed distribution.
– Modalities are Bayesian, conditioned on a set of possible worlds.
– Possible worlds are Aleatoric, sampled from a probability distribution.
We can imagine many different scenarios this way, and in some scenarios α
is true, and in some scenarios, α is false. The aleatoric calculus determines the
likelihood of a formula being true in this sampling process. What is convenient
about this process is that every sampling event is independent of every other
sampling event. Consequently, two subformulae can be evaluated independently,
allowing a simple mathematical interpretation for the formulae. We also restrict
agents reasoning capability solely to this sampling process. We cannot compare
probabilities directly to, say, reason that α is twice as likely as β. However, we
express that an agent considers a formula is impossible (i.e. (⊥ | α)i is true).
5and we can repeatedly sample formulae to get better approximations (e.g. (β →
α)n/2n tends to 0 with n if and only if α is less likely than β).
With the concept of agents sampling their mental model of the universe in
mind, we see that sampling ⊤ always returns true, and sampling ⊥ never returns
true. Sampling a random variable will return true in line with the probability
given by f . The variable will be resampled every time it appears in formula,
so the expectation for x ∧ x is typically not the same as the expectation for
x. Therefore a random variable with probability greater than 0 and less than 1
should only model an independent stochastic event, like flipping a coin. However,
if a game involves flipping a coin and leaving it hidden whilst players bet on its
orientation, we should not consider each reference to the coin’s orientation as an
independent event. Rather, we should consider two possible worlds: one where
the coin is heads; and one where the coin is tails.
The if-then-else operator, (α?β :γ), can be imagined as a sampling protocol.
We first sample α, and if α is true, we proceed to sample β and otherwise we
sample γ. We imagine an evaluator interpreting the formula by flipping a coin: if
it lands heads, we evaluate β; if it lands tails, we evaluate γ. This corresponds to
the additive property of Bayesian epistemology: if A and B are disjoint events,
then P (A or B) = P (A)+P (B)[2]. Here the two disjoint events are α and β and
¬αand γ, but disjointedness is only guaranteed if α and ¬α are evaluated from
the same sampling.
The conditional expectation operator (α | β)i expresses modality i’s expec-
tation of α marginalised by the expectation of β. This is, as in the Kolmogorov
definition of conditional probability, i’s expectation of α∧β divided by i’s expec-
tation of β. The intuition for these semantics corresponds to a sampling protocol.
The modality i samples a world from the probability distribution and samples β
at that world. If β is true, then i samples α at that world and returns the result.
Otherwise agent i resamples a world from their probability distribution, and re-
peats the process. In the case that β is never true, we assign (α |β)i probability
1, as being vacuously true.
Abbreviations: Some abbreviations we can define in MAC are as follows:
α ∧ β = (α?β :⊥) α ∨ β = (α?⊤ :β) α→ β = (α?β :⊤) ¬α = (α?⊥ :⊤)
Eiα = (α |⊤)i iα = (⊥|¬α)i
α
0
b = ⊤ α
a
b = ⊥ if b < a α
a
b = (α?α
a−1
b−1 :α
a
b−1 ) if a ≤ b
where a and b are natural numbers. We will show later that under certain circum-
stances these operators do correspond with their Boolean counterparts. However,
this is not true in the general case. The formula α∧β does not interpret directly
as α is true and β is true. Rather it is the likelihood of α being sampled as true,
followed by β being sampled as true. For this reason α∧α is not the same as α.
Similarly α ∨ β is the likelihood of α being sampled as true, or in the instance
that it was not true, that β was sampled as true.
The modality Eiα is agent i’s expectation of α being true, which is just α
conditioned on the uniformly true ⊤. The operator iα corresponds to the ne-
cessity operator of standard modal logic, and uses a property of the conditional
6operator: it evaluates (α |β)i as vacuously true if and only if there is no expec-
tation that β can ever be true. Therefore, (⊥|¬α)i can only be true if modality
i always expects ¬α to be false, and thus for the modality i, α is necessarily
true. The formula α
a
b allows us to explicitly represent degrees of belief in the
language. It is interpreted as α is true at least a times out of b. Note that this is
not a statement saying what the frequency of α is. Rather it describes the event
of α being true a times out of b. Therefore, if α was unlikely (say true 5% of the
time) then α
9
9 describes an incredibly unlikely event.
3.3 Example
We will give simple example of reasoning in MAC. Suppose we have an aleator
(dice player), considering the outcome of a role of a die. While the dice is fair,
our aleator does not know whether it is a four sided die or a six sided die. We
consider a single proposition: p1 if the result of throw of the die is 1. The aleator
considers two worlds equally possible: w4 where the die has four sides, and w6
where the die has 6 sides. The probability model P = (W,pi, f) is depicted in
Figure 1: We can formulate properties such as “at least one of the next two
p1 :
1
4
w4
p1 :
1
6
w6
1
2
1
2
Fig. 1. A probability model for an aleator who does not know whether the die is four
sided (w4) or six sided (w6).
throws will be a 1”: p
1
2
1 = (p1?⊤ : p1). We can calculate Pw4(p
1
2
1 ) =
7
16 , while
Pw6(p
1
2
1 ) =
11
36 . Now if we asked our aleator what are the odds of rolling a second
1, given the first roll was 1, we would evaluate the formula (p1 | p1)a (where a
is our aleator), and in either world this evaluates to 524 . Note that this involves
some speculation from the aleator.
4 Axioms for the modal aleatoric calculus
Having seen the potential for representing stochastic games, we will now look
at some reasoning techniques. First we will consider some axioms to derive con-
straints on the expectations of propositions, as an analogue of a Hilbert-style
proof system for modal logic. In the following section we will briefly analyse the
model checking problem, as a direct application of the semantic definitions.
Our approach here is to seek a derivation system that can generate equalities
that are always valid in MAC. For example, α ∧ β ≃ β ∧ α will be satisfied by
7every world of every model. We use the relation ≃ to indicate that two formulae
are equivalent in the calculus, and the operator ∼= to indicate the expectation
assigned to each formula will be equal in all probability models. We show that
the calculus is sound, and sketch a proof of completeness in the most basic case.
4.1 The aleatoric calculus
The aleatoric calculus, AC, is the language of ⊤, ⊥, x and (α?β : γ), where
x ∈ X . The interpretation of this fragment only depends on a single world and
it is the analogue of propositional logic in the non-probabilistic setting. The
axioms of the calculus are:
id x ≃ x vacuous (x?⊤ :⊥) ≃ x
ignore (x?y :y) ≃ y tree ((x?y :z)?p :q) ≃ (x?(y?p :q) : (z?p :q))
always (⊤?x :y) ≃ x swap (x?(y?p :q) : (y?r :s)) ≃ (y?(x?p :r) : (x?q :s))
never (⊥?x :y) ≃ y
We also have the rules of transitivity, symmetry and substitution for ≃:
Trans : If α ≃ β and β ≃ γ then α ≃ γ
Sym : If α ≃ β then β ≃ α
Subs : If α ≃ β and γ ≃ δ then α[x\γ] ≃ β[x\δ]
where α[x\γ] is α with every occurrence of the variable x replaced by γ. We let
this system of axioms and rules be referred to as AC.
As an example of reasoning in this system, we will show that the commuta-
tivity of ∧ holds:
(x?y :⊥) ≃ (x?(y?⊤ :⊥) : (y?⊥ :⊥)) vacuous, ignore
≃ (y?(x?⊤ :⊥) : (x?⊥ :⊥)) swap
≃ (y?x :⊥) vacuous, ignore
The axiom system AC is sound. The majority of these axioms are simple
to derive from Definition 3, and all proofs essentially show that the semantic
interpretation of the left and right side of the equation are equal. The rules
Trans and Sym come naturally with equality, and the rule Subs follows because
at any world, all formulae are probabilistically independent.
We present arguments for the soundness of the less obvious tree and swap
below. As the aleatoric calculus is only interpreted with respect to a single world,
we will drop the subscript from the evaluation function Pw. We will also use the
abbreviation ¬α for (α?⊥ :⊤) noting P (¬α) = 1− P (α).
Lemma 1. P (¬(x?α :β)) = P ((x?¬α :¬β))
Proof.
P (¬(x?y :z)) = 1− P ((x?y :z))
= 1− P (x)P (y)− P (¬x)P (z)
= 1− P (x)(1 − P (¬y))− P (¬x)(1 − P (¬z))
= 1− P (x) + P (x)P (¬y) − P (¬x) + P (¬x)P (¬z))
= P (x)P (¬y) + P (¬x)P (¬z))
= P ((x?¬y :¬z))
8Lemma 2. The tree axiom is sound with respect to ≃.
Proof. By Definition 3 and Lemma 1, we can show that
P (((x?y :z)?p :q))
= P ((x?y :z))P (p) + P (¬(x?y :z))P (q)
= P ((x?y :z))P (p) + P ((x?¬y :¬z))P (q)
= P (x)P (y)P (p) + P (¬x)P (z)P (p) + P (x)P (¬y)P (q) + P (¬x)P (¬z)P (q)
= P (x)(P (y)P (p) + P (¬y)P (q)) + P (¬x)(P (z)P (p) + P (¬z)P (q))
= P (x)P ((y?p :q)) + P (¬x)P ((z?p :q))
= P ((x?(y?p :q) : (z?p :q)))
for any P : X → [0, 1]. By Definition 3 this implies
((x?y :z)?p :q) ≃ (x?(y?p :q) : (z?p :q))
which is the tree axiom.
Lemma 3. The swap axiom is sound with respect to ≃.
Proof. By Definition 3, we can show that
P ((x?(y?z :p) : (y?r :z)))
= P (x)P ((y?z :p)) + P (¬x)P ((y?r :z))
= P (x)P (y)P (z) + P (x)P (¬y)P (p) + P (¬x)P (y)P (r) + P (¬x)P (¬y)P (z)
= P (y)(P (x)P (z) + P (¬x)P (r)) + P (¬y)(P (x)P (p) + P (¬x)P (z))
= P (y)P ((x?z :r)) + P (¬y)P ((x?p :z))
= P ((y?(x?z :r) : (x?p :z)))
for any P : X → [0, 1]. By 3 this implies
(x?(y?z :p) : (y?r :z)) ≃ (y?(x?z :r) : (x?p :z))
which is the swap axiom.
Lemma 4. The axiom system AC is sound for AC.
Proof. This follows from Lemmas 2 and 3 and Definition 3.2. Also, from the
semantics we can see that the interpretation of subformulae are independent
of one another, so the substitution rule holds, and the remaining rules follow
directly from the definition of ≃.
To show that AC complete for the aleatoric calculus, we aim to show that any
aleatoric calculus formula that are semantically equivalent can be transformed
into a common form. As the axioms of AC are equivalences this is sufficient to
show that the formulae are provably equivalent.
A tree form Aleatoric Calculus formula is either atomic, or it has an atomic
random variable condition and both its left and right subformulae are in tree
form.
9Definition 4. The set of all tree form Aleatoric Calculus formulae T ⊂ Φ is
generated by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= ⊤ | ⊥ | (x?ϕ :ϕ)
Lemma 5. For any Aleatoric Calculus formula there exists an equivalent (by
≃) tree form formula.
Proof. Boolean atoms (⊤ and ⊥) are in tree form by definition. By vacuous,
any atomic random variable x has an equivalent tree form (x?⊤ :⊥). Hence any
atomic formula has an equivalent tree form.
For non-atomic formula, we can show any compound aleatoric calculus for-
mula (µ?γ : δ) is ≃-equivalent to some formula with an atomic condition (i.e.
(x?ν1 : ν2)). Consider some compound formula (µ?γ : δ). Let us assume there
exists some (x?α :β) ≃ µ where x is atomic.
(µ?γ :δ) ≃ ((x?α :β)?γ :δ) Subs
≃ (x?(α?γ :δ) : (β?γ :δ)) tree
It follows by induction that any compound formulae has an equivalent formula
with an atomic condition. Furthermore we may assume that x is not ⊤ or ⊥
since
(⊤?α :β) ≃ α always,Sym
(⊥?β :α) ≃ α never,Sym
Therefore, if the left and right subformulae of a such a compound formula have
equivalent tree forms, by Subs we can susbtitute them into the original formula
to produce an equivalent tree form. It follows by induction that for any Aleatroic
Calculus formula there exists an equivalent tree form.
x
y
α β
γ
Fig. 2. The graphical representation of the formula (x?(y?α :β) :γ).
For ease of interpretation, we may represent tree form aleatroic calculus ex-
pressions graphically as in Figure 2.
Definition 5. A path in a tree form aleatoric calculus formula is a sequence
of tokens from the set {x, x | x ∈ X} corresponding to the outcomes of random
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trials involved in reaching a terminal node in the tree. We define the functions
⊤ and ⊥ to be the set of paths that terminate in a ⊤ or a ⊥ respectively:
⊤(⊤) = ⊥(⊥) = {()}, ⊤(⊥) = ⊥(⊤) = ∅,
⊤((x?α :β)) = {(x)⌢a | a ∈ ⊤(α)} ∪ {(x)⌢b | b ∈ ⊤(β)}
⊥((x?α :β)) = {(x)⌢a | a ∈ ⊥(α)} ∪ {(x)⌢b | b ∈ ⊥(β)}
where ⌢ is the sequence concatenation operator:
(a1, . . . , an)
⌢
(b1, . . . , bn) = (a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn)
We say two paths are multi-set equivalent if the multiset of tokens that appear
in each path are equivalent, and define P (φ) = ⊤(φ) ∪ ⊥(φ) to be the set of all
paths through a formula.
Lemma 6. For any tree form aleatoric calculus formula α:
P (α) =
∑
t∈⊤(α)
∏
x∈t
P (x)
where P (x) = (1− P (x)).
Proof. This follows immediately from the Definition 3.
x
x
(x, x) y
(x, x, y) (x, x, y)
x
y
(x, x, y) (x, x, y)
(x, x)
Fig. 3. An example of paths for a tree form, corresponding to φ = (x?(x?⊥ :y) : (x?y :
⊥)). The set ⊤(φ) is {(x, x, y), (x, x, y)}.
Lemma 7. Suppose that φ is a formula in tree form such that a = (a0, . . . , an) ∈
⊤(φ) (resp. ⊥(φ)). Then, for any i < n there is some formula φia such that:
1. φ ≃ φia
2. (a0, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, ai, ai+2, . . . , an) ∈ ⊤(φia) (resp. ⊥(φ))
3. φ and φia agree on all paths that do not have the prefix (a0, . . . , ai−1. That is,
for all b ∈ P (φ) ∪ P (φia), where for some j < i, bj 6= aj, we have b ∈ ⊤(φ)
if and only if b ∈ ⊤(φia) and b ∈ ⊥(φ) if and only if b ∈ ⊥(φ
i
a).
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Proof. This is trivially true for an empty path or a path of unit length, as there
is no way to reorder either such path. Let us now assume this statement holds
for a path of length n. Consider a path a of length n + 1, n > 0, and suppose
i ≤ n is given. Suppose ai ∈ {x, x}, and ai+1 ∈ {x, y}. If ai = x and ai+1 = y
then φ has a subformula (x?(y?α : β) : γ) with the path leading to the formula
matching (a0, . . . , i). Similar subformulae can be found for the other possibilities
of ai and ai+1. We can consider this path as the concatenation of a unit path
(the head) and a path of length n (the tail):
a = (a0)
⌢(a1, . . . , an)
Let a′ = (a′0, a
′
1, . . . , a
′
n) be some arbitrary target permutation of a. If a
′
0 = a0,
we can simply reorder (a1, . . . , an) as desired. Otherwise, it follows that a
′
0 must
appear somewhere in the tail of a. We may therefore permute the tail of a such
that a′0 is at its head:
(a0)
⌢
(a′0, . . .)
Let us assume that a0 ∈ {x, x}, a′0 ∈ {y, y}, and that the tail of (a
′
0, . . .) is a
path through a subtree α. This gives four possible tree structures, all of which
may be rearranged using ignore and swap:
(x?(y?α :β) :γ) ≃ (x?(y?α :β) : (y?γ :γ)) ≃ (y?(x?α :γ) : (x?β :γ))
(x?(y?β :α) :γ) ≃ (x?(y?β :α) : (y?γ :γ)) ≃ (y?(x?β :γ) : (x?α :γ))
(x?γ : (y?α :β)) ≃ (x?(y?γ :γ) : (y?α :β)) ≃ (y?(x?γ :α) : (x?γ :β))
(x?γ : (y?β :α)) ≃ (x?(y?γ :γ) : (y?β :α)) ≃ (y?(x?γ :β) : (x?γ :α))
Combined with the substitution rule we define φia as the reulst of performing
these transformations with in φ. Then φia ≃ φ, and as α remains the subformula
after ai+1 and ai, the suffix of the path remains the same. Finally, as the sub-
stitution will only affect the subtree where the substitution occurs, the paths
without the prefix (a0, . . . , ai) remain unchanged.
Therefore, we are able repeatdly apply this construcion to permute the elements
of paths within a formula.
Lemma 8. Given a pair of multi-set equivalent paths a and b in a tree form
aleatoric calculus formula, φ, such that a ∈ ⊤(φ) and b ∈ ⊥(φ), we can find a
formula φba ≃ φ where
1. a ∈ ⊥(φba) and b ∈ ⊤(φ
b
a)
2. ⊤(φba)− {b} = ⊤(φ)− {a},
3. ⊥(φba)− {a} = ⊥(φ) − {b}.
Proof. Suppose a and b have length 2. There are exactly two permutations for
a path of length two, the original, and its reverse. If the paths are of the form
(x, x) and (x, x) respectively, then it follows that the tree must be of the form
(x?(x?α : β) : (x?γ : δ)), and so the paths can be swapped using swap. Let us
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now assume that this statement holds for all paths of length at most n > 1.
Consider a pair of multiset-equivalent paths of length n+ 1 in (x?µ :ν). If both
paths start with x, then we can remove this x from both and instead have two
multiset-equivalent paths of length n in µ, which by our earlier assumption we are
able to swap. Similarly, if both paths start with x we can remove it from both
and recurse into ν. Otherwise, one path must start with x, and pass through
µ, while the other starts with x, and passes through ν. Let us refer to these
paths as l = (x, t, . . .), t ∈ {y, y} and r = (x, r1, . . .), respectively. Since l and
r are multiset-equivalent, it follows that r must contain at least one t term. By
lemma 7, we are able to rearrange ν to permute the subpath of r it contains in
order to bring a t term to the head of the subpath. Note that this rearrangement
is reversible. This gives a permutation (()x, t, . . . ) of r. Since both paths now
have the same second element, t ∈ {y, y}, it follows that both subtrees must
have y at their root. We are therefore able to apply swap:
(x?(y?α :β) : (y?γ :δ)) ≃ (y?(x?α :γ) : (x?β :δ))
This in turn swaps the first two elements of l and r to give (t, x, . . .) and (t, x, . . .).
Since both paths now start with the same element, t, and are therefore in the
same subtree, we can remove this t term and instead have two multiset-equivalent
paths of length n in either the left or right subtree, which we are able to swap as
per our earlier assumption. We are then able to replace t in both paths and re-
verse our previous rearrangements. Since only the leaves were swapped, reversing
the process gives us the original tree except that the two leaves corresponding
to the given paths have been swapped. We have therefore shown that if this
statement holds true for a pair of paths of length n > 1, it must also hold for a
pair of paths of length n+ 1.
Lemma 9. For any pair of tree form aleatoric calculus formulae, φ and ψ, there
exists a pair of tree forms φ′ ≃ φ and ψ′ ≃ ψ, such that P (φ′) = P (ψ′).
Proof. Let us consider a pair of tree forms L and R of heights hL and hR,
respectively. In the case that m = n = 0, both trees are already atomic leaves,
and so the statement holds. Next consider the case that L = (x?α :β) and hR = 0.
We can construct (x?R :R) ≃ R, and therefore require the statement holds for
the pairs α and R and β and R. Since α and β must be shorter than L, it follows
by induction that the statement holds for all hL >= 0, hR = 0. A similar process
works to show the statement holds for all hL = 0, hR >= 0. Next consider the
case that L = (x?α : β) and R = (y?γ : δ). We may construct L ≃ (y?L : L)
and require that the statement holds for the pairs L and γ and L and δ. Since
γ and δ must be shorter than R, and we have shown that the statement holds
for all hL >= 0, hR = 0, it follows by induction that the statement holds for
all hL >= 0, hR >= 0, and hence for all pairs of tree form aleatoric calculus
formulae.
Theorem 1. For any pair of semantically equivalent aleatoric calculus formulae
φ and ψ, we can show φ ≃ ψ.
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Proof. By Lemma 5 it is possible to convert both formulae in question, φ and ψ,
into tree form, respectively φτ and ψτ . By Lemma 9 it is then possible to convert
φτ and ψτ to a pair of equivalent formulae, respectively Φ and Ψ , with the same
structure (so ⊤(Φ) ∪ ⊥(Φ) = ⊤(Ψ) ∪ ⊥(Ψ)), but possibly different leaves (so
⊤(Φ) is possibly not the same as ⊤(Ψ)). By Lemma 8 it is possible to swap any
multiset-equivalent paths between ⊤(Φ) and ⊥(Φ). By Lemma 6 two formula, Φ
and Ψ , with the same structure are semantically equivalent if and only if there is
a one-to-one correspondence between paths of Φ and Ψ such that corresponding
paths a and b are multi-set equivalent, and a ∈ ⊤(Φ) if and only if b ∈ ⊤(Ψ).
Therefore, if and only if the two formulae are equivalent we are able to define Φ′
by swapping paths between ⊤(Φ) and ⊥(Φ) such that Φ′ = Ψ . As all steps are
performed using the axioms and are reversible, this is sufficient to show φ ≃ ψ.
4.2 The Modal Aleatoric Calculus
The modal aleatoric calculus includes the propositional fragment, as well as
the conditional expectation operator (α | β)i that depends on the modality i’s
probability distribution over the set of worlds.
The axioms we have for the conditional expectation operator are as follows:
A0 : ((x?y :z) |c)i ≃ ((x |c)i?(y |(x?c :⊥))i : (z |(x?⊥ :c))i).
A1 : (⊥|x)i ∧ (x |y)i ≃ (⊥|x ∨ y)i
A2 : (⊥|x)i ≃ ((⊥|x)i?(⊥|x)i :¬(⊥|x)i)
A3 : (⊤|x)i ≃ ⊤
A4 : (x |⊥)i ≃ ⊤
We let the axiom system MAC be the axiom system AC along with the axioms
A0-A5.
We note that the conditional expectation operator (x |y)i is its own dual, but
only in the case that agent i does not consider x and y to be mutually exclusive:
(¬x |y)i ≃ (x |y)i → i(¬(x ∧ y)). We can see this in the following derivation:
(¬x |y)i ≃ ((x?⊥ :⊤) |y)i abb.
≃ ((x |y)i?(⊥|x ∧ y)i : (⊤|(x?⊥ :⊥))i) A0
≃ (x |y)i → i¬(x ∧ y) abb.
The main axiom in MAC is the axiom A0 which is a rough analogue of the
K axiom in modal logic. We note that in this axiom:
((x?y :z) |c)i ≃ ((x |c)i?(y |(x?c :⊥))i : (z |(x?⊥ :c))i)
if we substitute ⊤ for y and ⊥ for w, we have:
Eix ∧ (y |x)i ≃ Ei(x ∧ y)
whenever agent i considers x possible (so that (⊥ | ¬x)i ≃ ⊥). In that case we
can “divide” both sides of the semantic equality by Pw(Eix) which gives the
Kolmogorov definition of conditional probability:
Pw((y |x)i) =
Pw(Ei(x ∧ y))
Pw(Eix)
.
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Axioms A1 and A2 deal with formulas of the type (⊥|α)i. The probability
associated with such formulas is non-zero if and only if α is impossible in all the
successor states, so in these states, we are able to substitute α with ⊥.
Finally axioms A3 and A4 allow us to eliminate conditional expectation
operators.
As with the aleatoric calculus, soundness can be shown by deriving equiva-
lence of the semantic evaluation equations, although the proofs are more com-
plex.
We show the soundness of A0 and A1. The soundness of A2-4 follows im-
mediately from the semantic definition.
Lemma 10. The Axiom A0 is sound.
Proof. We derive soundness for A0 from right to left as follows, assuming an
arbitrary probability model P = (W,pi, f): We use the abbreviation Eiw(α) from
Definition 3 to allow a succinct presentation.
Pw(((x |a)i?(y |x ∧ a)i : (z |¬x ∧ a)i))
= Pw((x |a)i).Pw((y |x ∧ a)i) + (1− Pw((x |a)i)).Pw((z |¬x ∧ a)i).
For the first term we have:
Pw((x |a)i).Pw((y |x ∧ a)i)
=
Eiw(x ∧ a)
Eiw(a)
.
Eiw(y ∧ x ∧ a)
Eiw(x ∧ a)
=
Eiw(y ∧ x ∧ a)
Eiw(a)
.
For the second term we have:
(1− Pw((x |a)i)).Pw((z |¬x ∧ a)i)
=
Eiw(a)− E
i
w(x ∧ a)
Eiw(a)
.
Eiw(z ∧ a ∧ ¬x)
Eiw(a ∧ ¬x)
=
Eiw(a)− E
i
w(x ∧ a)
Eiw(a)
.
Eiw(z ∧ a ∧ ¬x)
EiW (a)− E
i
w(a ∧ x)
=
Eiw(z ∧ a ∧ ¬x)
Eiw(a)
Putting these together we get:
Pw(((x |a)i?(y |x ∧ a)i : (z |¬x ∧ a)i))
=
Eiw(z ∧ a ∧ ¬x) + E
i
w(y ∧ x ∧ a)
Eiw(a)
=
Eiw((x?y :z))
Eiw(a)
= Pw(((x?y :z) |a)i)
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Lemma 11. The Axiom A1 is sound.
Proof. We can show that A1 is sound by considering cases:
– If Eiw(x) = 0 and E
i
w(y) = 0, then E
i
w(x ∨ y) = 0, so Pw((bot | x)i) = 1,
Pw((x |y)i) = 1 and Pw((⊥|x ∨ y)i) = 1.
– If Eiw(x) = 0 and E
i
w(y) 6= 0, then E
i
w(x ∨ y) 6= 0, so Pw((x | y)i) = 0 and
Pw((⊥|x ∨ y)i) = 0.
– If Eiw(x) 6= 0 and E
i
w(y) = 0, then E
i
w(x ∨ y) 6= 0, so Pw((bot |x)i) = 0 and
Pw((⊥|x ∨ y)) = 0.
– If Eiw(x) 6= 0 and E
i
w(y) 6= 0, then E
i
w(x ∨ y) 6= 0, so Pw((bot |x)i) = 0 and
Pw((⊥|x ∨ y)) = 0.
In all cases the equality holds, so the axiom is sound.
Corollary 1. The system MAC is sound for MAC.
Proof. The nontrivial cases of A0 and A1 are presented above and the axioms
A2, A3 and A4 follow immediately from the semantics.
We conjecture that MAC is complete for the given semantics.
Conjecture 1. The system MAC is complete for MAC.
The intuition for this conjecture is based on the correspondence between MAC
and modal logic. This correspondence is formalised in the following section. The
axiomatization MAC is adequate to show all basic equivalences of the calculus,
and mirror modal reasoning inK. We anticipate that completeness can be shown
in a similar fashion to the completeness of AC above:
1. we define a cannonical form where non-equivalent cannonical forms have a
witnessing structure, that gives a different interpretation of each formula;
2. we show that every formula is provably equivalent to a cannonical formula
in MAC.
This is sufficien to show completeness, but so far the required constructions have
been hard to find.
5 Expressivity
In this section we show that the modal aleatoric calculus generalises the modal
logic K. The syntax and semantics of modal logic are given over a set of atomic
propositions Q. The syntax of Kn is given by:
φ ::= q | φ ∧ φ | ¬φ | φ
where q ∈ Q, and the operators are respectively and, not, necessary. The seman-
tics of Kn are given with respect to an epistemic model M = (W,R, V ) where
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W is the nonempty, countable set of possible worlds, R ⊆W ×W is the accessi-
bility relation, and V : Q −→ 2W is an assignment of propositions to states. We
require that:
1 ∀w, u, v ∈ W, u ∈ R(w) and v ∈ R(w) implies v ∈ R(u)
2 ∀w, u, v ∈ W, u ∈ R(w) and v ∈ R(u) implies v ∈ R(w)
3 ∀w ∈W, R(w) 6= ∅.
We describe the set of worlds ‖α‖M in the model M = (W,R, V ) that satisfy
the formula α by induction as follows:
‖q‖M = V (q) ‖α ∧ β‖M = ‖α‖M ∩ ‖β‖M
‖¬]α‖M =W − ‖α‖M ‖α‖M = {u ∈ W | uR ⊆ ‖α‖M}
where ∀u ∈W , uRα = uR∩‖α‖M , if uRα∩‖α‖M 6= ∅ and uRα = uR, otherwise.
We say MAC generalises K if there is some map Λ from pointed epistemic
models to pointed probability models, and some map λ from K formulae to
MAC formulae such that for all pointed epistemic modelsMw, for allK formulae
φ, w ∈ ‖φ‖M if and only if Λ(Mw)(λ(φ)) = 1.
We suppose that for every atomic proposition q ∈ Q, there is a unique atomic
variable xq ∈ X . Then the map Λ is defined as follows: Given M = (W,R, V )
and w ∈ W , Λ(Mw) = Pw where P = (W,pi, f) and
– ∀u, v ∈W , pii(u, v) > 0 if and only if v ∈ uR1.
– ∀w ∈W , ∀q ∈ Q, fw(xq) = 1 if w ∈ V (q) and fw(xq) = 0 otherwise.
This transformation replaces the atomic propositions with variables that, at
each world, are either always true or always false, and replaces the accessibility
relation at a world w with a probability distribution that is non-zero for precisely
the worlds accessible from w. It is clear that there is a valid probability model
that satisfies these properties.
We also define the map λ from K to MAC with the following induction:
λ(q) = xq λ(α ∧ β) = (λ(α)?λ(β) :⊥)
λ(¬α) = (λ(α)?⊥ :⊤) λ(α) = (⊥|(λ(α)?⊥ :⊤))
Lemma 12. For all epistemic models M = (W,R, V ), for all w ∈W , for all K
formula φ, we have w ∈ ‖φ‖M if and only if Λ(Mw)(λ(φ)) = 1.
Proof. Given M = (W,R, V ) and w ∈ W , we let Pw = Λ(Mw), where P =
(W, pi, f). We proceed by induction over the complexity of the Kn formula φ.
The induction hypothesis is that for all subformulae ψ of φ, for all w ∈ W ,
w ∈ ‖ψ‖M implies Pw(ψ) = 1, and w /∈ ‖ψ‖M implies Pw(ψ) = 0.
– As the base case of the induction, we suppose φ = q. Then w ∈ ‖φ‖M implies
w ∈ V (q) which implies f(xq) = 1. Conversely, if w /∈ ‖φ‖M , then w /∈ V (q)
so f(xq) = 0.
1 We note this function is not deterministic, but this does not impact the final result.
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– Given φ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2, if w ∈ ‖φ‖M , then w ∈ ‖ψ1‖ ∩ ‖ψ2‖, so by the induc-
tion hypothesis, Pw(λ(ψ)) = Pw(λ(ψ2)) = 1. As λ(φ) = (λ(ψ1)?λ(ψ2) :⊥)
we have Pw(λ(φ)) = Pw(λ(ψ1)).Pw(λ(ψ2) = 1. Conversely, if w /∈ ‖ψ‖
M ,
then either w /∈ ‖ψ1‖M , or w /∈ ‖ψ2‖M . We assume, w.l.o.g., w /∈
‖ψ1‖, and by the induction hypothesis, Pw(λ(ψ1) = 0. Thus, Pw(λ(φ)) =
Pw(λ(ψ1)).Pw(λ(ψ2) = 0.
– Given φ = ¬ψ, we have w ∈ ‖φ‖M if and only if w /∈ ‖ψ‖M . If w ∈ ‖ψ‖M ,
then Pw(λ(ψ)) = 1, so Pw((λ(ψ)?⊥ :⊤)) = 0. If w /∈ ‖ψ‖M , then Pw(λ(ψ)) =
0, so we have Pw(λ(φ)) = 1.
– Given φ = iψ, then w ∈ ‖φ‖
M if and only if for all u ∈ wRi, u ∈ ‖ψ‖
M .
By the induction hypothesis we have for all u ∈ wRi, Pu(ψ) = 1, so
Pu((λ(ψ)?⊥ : ⊤)) = 0. From the definition of Λ we have u ∈ wRi if
and only if pii(w, u) 6= 0. Therefore,
∑
u∈W pii(w, u)Pu((λ(ψ)?⊥ : ⊤)) = 0
and so by Definition 3.2, Pw(λ(φ)) = Pw((⊥ | (λ(ψ)?⊥ : ⊤))i) = 1. Con-
versely, if w /∈ ‖φ‖M , then for some u ∈ wRi we have u /∈ ‖ψ‖M . By
the induction hypothesis, Pu(λ(ψ)) = 0, and as pii(w, u) > 0, we have∑
u∈W pii(w, u)Pu((λ(ψ)?⊥ :⊤)) > 0. Therefore, the Pu(⊥) term dominates
the expression for Pw(λ(φ)) as follows:
Pw(λ(φ)) =
∑
u∈W pii(w, u).Pu((λ(ψ)?⊥ :⊤)).Pu(⊥)∑
u∈W pii(w, u)Pu((λ(ψ)?⊥ :⊤))
= 0.
6 Case Study
We present a case study using some simple actions in a dice game illustrating
the potential for reasoning in AI applications. A simple version of the game pig2
uses a four sided dice, and players take turns. Each turn, the player rolls the
dice as many times as they like, adding the numbers the roll to their turn total.
However, if they roll a 1, their turn total is set to 0, and their turn ends. They
can elect to stop at any time, in which case their turn total is added to their
score.
To illustrate the aleatoric calculus we suppose that for our dice we have two
random variables, odd and gt2 (greater than 2). Every roll of the dice can be seen
as a sampling of these two variables: 1 is an odd number not greater than 2, and
so on. Now we suppose that there is some uncertainty to the fairness of the dice,
so it is possible that there is a 70% chance of the dice rolling a number greater
than 2. However, we consider this unlikely and only attach a 10% likelihood to
this scenario. Finally, we suppose there is an additional random variable called
risk which can be used to define a policy. For example, we might roll again if
the risk variable is sampled as true. This scenario if visualised in Figure 4.
We can now build aleatoric formula describing various situations, assuming
the dice is actually biased:
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pig (dice game)
18
odd : 0.5
gt2 : 0.7
risk : 0.5
biased
odd : 0.5
gt2 : 0.5
risk : 0.5
fair
0.1 0.9
Fig. 4. A simple two world representation of the game pig, where the dice is possibly
biased. The biased world is the actual world.
Name Formula Description Prob
bust (gt2?⊥ :odd) the probability of rolling a 1 0.15
four (odd?⊥ :gt2) the probability of rolling a 4 0.35
thinkBust (bust |⊤) the chance given to rolling a 1 0.265
think-4-1 (bust |four) the chance of rolling a 1 given a 4 0.237
rollAgain (thinkBust1/2?risk :⊤) whether to roll again 0.77
These formulas show the different types of information that can be repre-
sented: bust and four are true random variables (aleatoric information), whereas
thinkBust and think-4-1 are based on an agent’s mental model (Bayesian in-
formation). Finally rollAgain describes the condition for a policy. In a dynamic
extension of this calculus, given prior assumptions about policies, agents may
apply Bayesian conditioning to learn probability distributions from observations.
7 Conclusion
The modal aleatoric calculus is shown to be a true generalisation of modal logic,
but gives a much richer language that encapsulates probabilistic reasoning and
degrees of belief. We have shown that the modal aleatoric calculus is able to
describe probabilistic strategies for agents. We have provided a sound axioma-
tization for the calculus, shown it is complete for the aleatoric calculus and we
are working to show that the axiomatization is complete for the modal aleatoric
calculus. Future work will consider dynamic variations of the logic, where agents
apply Bayesian conditioning based on their observations to learn the probability
distribution of worlds.
References
1. Baltag, A., Smets, S.: Group belief dynamics under iterated revision: fixed points
and cycles of joint upgrades. In: Proc. of 12th TARK. pp. 41–50 (2009)
2. Bovens, L., Hartmann, S.: Bayesian epistemology. Oxford University Press (2003)
3. Cohen, W.W., Yang, F., Mazaitis, K.R.: Tensorlog: Deep learning meets proba-
bilistic dbs. arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.05390 (2017)
4. De Finetti, B.: Theory of probability: a critical introductory treatment. John Wiley
& Sons (1970)
19
5. van Ditmarsch, H., van der Hoek, W., Kooi, B.: Dynamic Epistemic Logic, Synthese
Library, vol. 337. Springer (2007)
6. Fagin, R., Halpern, J.Y., Megiddo, N.: A logic for reasoning about probabilities.
Information and computation 87(1-2), 78–128 (1990)
7. Feldman, Y.A., Harel, D.: A probabilistic dynamic logic. In: Proceedings of the
fourteenth annual ACM symposium on theory of computing. pp. 181–195 (1982)
8. Hailperin, T.: Boole’s logic and probability: a critical exposition from the stand-
point of contemporary algebra, logic and probability theory (1976)
9. Halpern, J.Y.: Reasoning about uncertainty. MIT press (2017)
10. Hintikka, J.: Knowledge and Belief. Cornell University Press (1962)
11. Hommersom, A., Lucas, P.J.: Generalising the interaction rules in probabilistic
logic. In: 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (2011)
12. J. van Benthem, J.G., Kooi, B.: Dynamic update with probabilities. Studia Logica
93(1), 67–96 (2009)
13. Kooi, B.P.: Probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic. Journal of Logic, Language and
Information 12(4), 381–408 (2003)
14. Kooi, B.: Dynamic epistemic logic. In: van Benthem, J., ter Meulen, A. (eds.)
Handbook of Logic and Language. pp. 671–690. Elsevier (2011), second edition
15. Kozen, D.: A probabilistic PDL. Journal of Computer and System Sciences 30(2),
162–178 (1985)
16. Milne, P.: Bruno de Finetti and the logic of conditional events. The British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science 48(2), 195–232 (1997)
17. Nilsson, N.J.: Probabilistic logic. Artificial intelligence 28(1), 71–87 (1986)
18. Plaza, J.: Logics of public communications. In: Proc. of the 4th ISMIS. pp. 201–216.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory (1989)
19. Stalnaker, R.C.: A theory of conditionals. In: Ifs, pp. 41–55. Springer (1968)
20. Stalnaker, R.C., Thomason, R.H.: A semantic analysis of conditional logic 1. Theo-
ria 36(1), 23–42 (1970)
21. Williamson, J.: From bayesian epistemology to inductive logic. Journal of Applied
Logic 11(4), 468–486 (2013)
22. Zadeh, L.A.: Fuzzy sets. In: Fuzzy Sets, Fuzzy Logic, And Fuzzy Systems: Selected
Papers by Lotfi A Zadeh, pp. 394–432. World Scientific (1996)
